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Introduction
The prospective payment system (PPS) is commonly used 
to reimburse hospitals across Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries [1]. It 
is built on a patient classification system that categorises 
patients into resource homogeneous groups, with each hos-
pital receiving a fixed pre-determined tariff for every patient 
falling into a given group. This generates incentives for hos-
pitals to contain costs.
In its purest form, a PPS reimburses hospitals only on 
the basis of the volume and type of patients treated, without 
taking organisational characteristics into account. Under 
the German PPS, for example, tariffs do not depend on the 
hospital’s ownership status or membership to the national 
insurance programme [2]. In contrast, other PPSs do con-
sider organisational characteristics. In the French PPS, for 
instance, prices differ for public and private hospitals [3]. 
In some countries, the PPS provides greater compensation 
to allow for the costs of specialist care. An example is the 
PPS of the Lombardy region in Italy, which applies a tariff 
top-up to all hospitals with ‘high specialisation’ units [4]. 
In England, hospitals are paid extra if their patients receive 
specialised care [5].
Some health care systems feature hospitals that special-
ise in a single specialty, such as cardiology, ophthalmology, 
or orthopaedics.1 Specialisation is an organisational form 
which is supposed to generate the benefits of the ‘focused 
factory’, i.e., greater efficiency, quality, and responsive-
ness [12–14] but not necessarily lower costs. In the US, the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission showed that the 
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costs of specialist hospitals were no lower than the costs of 
general hospitals. While cardiac hospitals’ costs were not 
significantly different from general hospitals’, orthopaedic 
and surgical hospitals had 20% higher inpatient costs. Higher 
costs were due to more specialised and costly facilities, 
higher staffing levels, better quality of care, but also excess 
capacity and low inpatient volumes [15, 16].
Such findings have stimulated empirical research on spe-
cialist hospitals’ costs. Barro et al. [17] study the impact of 
specialist cardiac hospitals on overall expenditure and qual-
ity in the US between 1996 and 1999. They find that entry 
of specialist hospitals reduces expenditure growth without 
affecting outcomes. Carey et al. [18] investigate the cost effi-
ciency of US specialist hospitals between 1998 and 2004. 
They find higher levels of inefficiency in orthopaedic and 
surgical hospitals compared to general hospitals. Kim et al. 
[9] analyse South Korean specialty orthopaedic hospitals 
between 2010 and 2012, which are found to apply higher 
patients’ charges than general hospitals. The authors suggest 
that such higher charges are due to greater set-up, invest-
ment, staffing, and treatment costs.
The present study contributes to this small empirical lit-
erature. We investigate the financial viability of specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals relative to trauma and orthopaedics 
(T&O) departments in general hospitals in the English 
National Health Service (NHS). Our primary objective is 
to test whether costs of specialist orthopaedic hospitals are 
higher than T&O departments in general hospitals even after 
accounting for differences in revenues. In other words, we 
test whether the current PPS covers the costs of specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals relative to T&O departments in gen-
eral hospitals.
In England, the majority of hospitals are funded through 
the national tariff payment system (NTPS).2 The NTPS is 
characterised by two key elements: the healthcare resource 
groups (HRGs), which classify patients into homogene-
ous categories based on diagnoses, procedures and some 
patients characteristics [3]; and the tariffs, which vary by 
HRG and admission type (elective or non-elective) and 
reflect the national cost for an HRG averaged across all hos-
pitals [20]. An additional payment for excess bed days is 
made for patients whose length of stay is beyond a thresh-
old, called the trim point, which also varies by HRG and 
admission type.3 Both the base and excess bed day tariffs are 
adjusted by the market forces factor (MFF) index to account 
for exogenous geographical differences in input prices [21]. 
Tariffs are inflated if the patient receives specialised services 
under specific HRGs [5].4 With such a payment system, spe-
cialist hospitals are likely to obtain higher revenues owing 
to the greater proportion of patients within an HRG who 
receive a specialised service.
We collect data at HRG level from the NHS reference 
cost (RC) database for the financial year 2013/14. Such data 
allow us to analyse the unit cost per patient of every inpa-
tient HRG delivered through the T&O department of each 
hospital trust (hospital from now on) in the sample.5 Our 
econometric strategy employs four regressions. The first 
regression provides raw differences in unit costs between 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments. In a 
second regression, we compare unit costs after controlling 
for differential payments (due to different HRGs and other 
tariff corrections). This is our key model and provides dif-
ferences in profit margins between the two types of hospital: 
given that HRG tariffs are fixed, any differences in unit costs 
after controlling for differences in payment will be reflected 
in the profit margin. In the third regression, we explain any 
differences in profit margins (i.e., in costs after controlling 
for payment) as a function of possible determinants includ-
ing patient characteristics such as proportion of males, age, 
socio-economic status, number of diagnoses and procedures, 
and hospital characteristics such as the salary of doctors, 
hospital type, scale economies, quality, and geographical 
location. Our fourth regression examines the heterogeneity 
in profit margins across specialist hospitals. We estimate 
these models by weighted least squares (WLS), clustering 
standard errors within hospitals.
The English NHS includes 141 general hospitals with a 
T&O department and three specialist orthopaedic hospitals. 
Although there are few specialist orthopaedic hospitals, they 
play an important role in the English NHS. They deliver high 
proportions of specialised services, commonly low-volume 
but high-cost treatments for patients with complex and rare 
conditions. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals therefore allow 
the achievement of a critical mass of clinical expertise to 
ensure patients receive specialised treatments that produce 
better health outcomes [22]. For instance, they provide 90% 
of bone and soft tissue sarcoma surgeries, and 50% of scolio-
sis treatments. They also perform high proportions of more 
common, corrective procedures, such as 50% of revision 
2 More than 60% of hospital income comes from the NTPS. The 
remaining part is agreed in the NHS standard contract on the basis of 
actual activity [19].
3 The trim point is the maximum expected length of stay for a patient 
falling under a specific HRG. It is defined by the Department of 
Health in order to identify unusually long lengths of stay and statisti-
cal outliers [21].
4 At the time of our study, top-ups were paid for children’s, orthopae-
dic, spinal, and neurosciences specialised services. While all hospi-
tals can obtain the top-up for specialised orthopaedic services, top-
ups for the other specialised services are paid to a restricted number 
of eligible providers.
5 In the English NHS, a hospital trust or acute trust is an authority 
that provides secondary health care services through one or more 
acute hospitals.
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knee replacements and 20% of revision hip replacements 
[23]. We focus on specialist orthopaedic hospitals because 
T&O is the specialty with the fourth highest volume of 
patients, after general medicine, general surgery, and pae-
diatrics. In 2013, 6.7% of all NHS patients were treated in 
a T&O department.
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first 
attempts to study differences in profit margins between spe-
cialist hospitals and departments within general hospitals 
undertaking similar activities. Previous work focuses on 
either costs [e.g., [16] ] or revenues [e.g., [9] ]. Our analy-
sis is at the HRG level, rather than patient level, making 
use of cost data that all English hospitals are required to 
report annually to the Department of Health (DH). This is 
a natural choice since payment is also at the HRG level and 
our focus is on controlling for differences in payment across 
hospital types. As cost data are available only at HRG-level 
in most countries, our methodological approach can easily 
be employed and replicated in future studies, either to com-
pare specialist and general hospitals, or to make other types 
of comparison, such as between teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals.
In the next four sections of the paper, respectively, we 
provide the economic framework, describe the economet-
ric strategy, illustrate the data and some descriptive statis-
tics, and present the results. The final section discusses and 
concludes.
Economic framework
Under a PPS, hospitals are funded according to the number 
and type of patients treated. In the English payment system, 
the total revenue of hospital k = 1,… ,K for providing HRG 
j = 1,… , J amounts to:
where RIN
jk
 is the total inlier revenue of hospital k for treating 
patients who have a normal length of stay for their HRG j; 
REB
jk
 is the total excess bed day revenue of hospital k earned 
for each additional day that patients stay beyond their spe-
cific HRG j’s trim point; pIN
jk
 is the HRG inlier price received 
by hospital k for treating a patient falling under HRG j; pEB
jk
 
is the per diem price received by hospital k for a single 
excess bed day produced under HRG j; t is the tariff top-up 
on specialised orthopaedic services, which is a constant pro-
portion across HRGs and hospitals; ejk is the proportion of 
patients in hospital k falling under HRG j receiving a spe-
cialised orthopaedic treatment; yjk is the number of patients 
(1)Rjk = RINjk + REBjk = pINjk
(
1 + tejk
)
yjk + p
EB
jk
(
1 + tejk
)
qjk,
admitted in hospital k under HRG j;6 and qjk is the number 
of excess bed days produced in hospital k under HRG j.
The HRG prices pIN
jk
 and pEB
jk
 can be written more explic-
itly as:
where 훼IN
j
 is the inlier tariff for treating a patient falling 
under HRG j; 훼EB
j
 is the excess bed day tariff of each excess 
bed day under HRG j. These do not vary by hospital. In 
contrast, mk is a MFF index capturing exogenous geographi-
cal differences in the prices of hospital inputs (staff, land, 
and buildings) that vary depending on the hospital’s loca-
tion. Finally, b is a fixed tariff adjustment common across 
hospitals, such as pay and price inflation or the national effi-
ciency adjustment.
The total cost of hospital k for providing HRG j is:
where CIN
jk
 is the total inlier cost of hospital k for treating 
patients under HRG j (up to the trim point); CEB
jk
 is the total 
excess bed day cost of hospital k for the excess bed days 
produced under HRG j; cIN
jk
 is the inlier unit cost of hospital 
k for HRG j, and cEB
jk
 is the per diem unit cost of hospital k 
for each excess bed day falling under HRG j. Since the 
national tariffs are set equal to the national average cost, we 
can write them more explicitly as:
Therefore, the total profit function of hospital k for pro-
viding HRG j is:
The profit margin, i.e., the profit per patient allocated to 
HRG j in hospital k, can be written as:
(2)pINjk =
(
훼IN
j
+ b
)
mk,
(3)pEBjk =
(
훼EB
j
+ b
)
mk,
(4)Cjk = CINjk + CEBjk = cINjk yjk + cEBjk qjk,
(5)훼IN
j
=
∑
k c
IN
jk
yjk∑
k yjk
and 훼EB
j
=
∑
k c
EB
jk
qjk∑
k qjk
.
(6)
휋jk = R
IN
jk
− CIN
jk
+ REB
jk
− CEB
jk
=
[
pIN
jk
(
1 + tejk
)
− cIN
jk
]
yjk +
[
pEB
jk
(
1 + tejk
)
− cEB
jk
]
qjk.
(7)
?̃?jk =
𝜋jk
yjk
= pIN
jk
(
1 + tejk
)
− cIN
jk
+
[
pEB
jk
(
1 + tejk
)
− cEB
jk
]qjk
yjk
,
6 The number of patients is expressed by the number of finished con-
sultant episodes (FCEs). A FCE is a hospital episode for a patient 
under the care of an individual consultant.
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where pIN
jk
(
1 + tejk
)
− cIN
jk
 is the inlier profit margin of hos-
pital k for HRG j, and pEB
jk
(
1 + tejk
)
− cEB
jk
 is the per diem 
profit margin of hospital k for each excess bed day produced 
under HRG j. As prices are fixed, this simply demonstrates 
that profitability will vary according to differences in costs 
that are not accounted for in the payment arrangement.7
Several factors driving hospital unit costs may also 
explain differences between specialist and general hospitals. 
Following Bradford et al. [24], we summarise these in the 
following function:
where xjk is a vector of patient characteristics not captured 
by the HRG classification system; and zk is a vector of hospi-
tal characteristics, such as input prices that are not captured 
fully by the market forces adjustment, teaching activity, or 
economies of scale. For instance, specialist hospitals are 
likely to employ surgeons with advanced expertise that are 
paid higher salaries, and to use more costly high-tech equip-
ment. A high level of specialisation is likely to produce high 
quality of care and, perhaps, higher costs. Specialist hos-
pitals might attract higher volumes of patients, which may 
allow them to exploit economies of scale but could translate 
into larger proportions of complex patients requiring a more 
intensive use of resources. Below, in our empirical analysis, 
we are able to control for a number of such explanatory 
factors.
Econometric specification
We focus on four key specifications. The dependent variable 
is the log of the inlier unit cost (cIN
jk
) or the per diem unit cost 
(cEB
jk
).8 All models are estimated by WLS in order to take into 
account, respectively, the number of patients (yjk) or excess 
bed days (qjk) of every HRG within each hospital. Moreover, 
we cluster standard errors within hospitals in order to allow 
for any form of serial correlation of errors across HRGs.
(8)cjk = c
(
xjk, zk
)
,
In the first regression, model I, we test whether unit costs 
are on average higher in specialist orthopaedic hospitals 
before accounting for any differences in payments across 
hospitals:
where cjk is the inlier or per diem unit cost of HRG j in 
hospital k, μ is the intercept, sk is a dummy equals one if 
hospital k is a specialist orthopaedic hospital, and 휀jk is the 
error term.
The estimated coefficient 𝛽  translates into 𝛽 = exp
(
𝛽
)
− 1 
[25, p. 240; 26]. This expresses the percentage difference in 
unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments in general hospitals, i.e., 𝛽 =
(
c̄s − c̄g
)/
c̄g with 
c̄s and c̄g being respectively the specialist orthopaedic hos-
pitals and the T&O departments’ unit cost averaged across 
HRGs and hospitals. Suppose that 𝛽 > 0, which implies 
higher unit costs in specialist orthopaedic hospitals. This, 
however, does not necessarily imply that specialist orthopae-
dic hospitals have lower profit margins because no account 
is taken of hospital revenue. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals 
may provide more expensive treatments that are fully com-
pensated by a higher HRG tariff.
Our second and main econometric specification, model II, 
accounts for differences in payments across specialist ortho-
paedic hospitals and T&O departments:
where mk is the MFF index, ejk is the proportion of special-
ised services, and 훼j indicates a set of HRG fixed effects that 
controls for differences in average cost for each HRG; in 
turn, this controls for the fixed prices at HRG level, which 
are based on the average cost within each HRG.
This specification compares unit costs across specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments, after differ-
ences in the MFF and specialist top-up payments are taken 
into account. The tariffs are subtracted through the HRG 
fixed effects, i.e., a dummy variable for each HRG j. The 
estimated coefficient of every HRG dummy captures the 
average unit cost of the corresponding HRG category. Sup-
pose again that 𝛽 > 0 (computed using the estimated 𝛽  in 
model II). This result now implies that specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals exhibit lower profit margins compared with T&O 
departments.
If we find that specialist orthopaedic hospitals are less 
financially viable, the finding could be due to a number of 
competing reasons, which we account for in our model III. 
Following common practice [e.g., 27, 28], this model con-
trols for patient and hospital characteristics that may explain 
differences in unit costs in addition to differences in pay-
ments and, therefore, profitability:
(9)ln
(
cjk
)
= 휇 + 훽sk + 휀jk,
(10)ln
(
cjk
)
= 휇 + 훽sk + 훾mk + 훿ejk + 훼j + 휀jk,
8 We take the logarithm to improve model fit, since unit costs are 
left-skewed. All estimated coefficients are therefore interpreted as 
semi-elasticities.
7 To illustrate this point, suppose that a specialist orthopaedic hospi-
tal s and a T&O department in general hospital g have the same vol-
ume of patients and excess bed days (ys = yg, qs = qg), the same loca-
tion (ms = mg), and the same proportion of top-up tariffs (es = eg). 
Then, differences in profits will be equal to 
휋g − 휋s =
(
cIN
s
− cIN
g
)
yg +
(
cEB
s
− cEB
g
)
. For instance, 𝜋g − 𝜋s > 0 
implies that the specialist orthopaedic hospital has lower profit mar-
gins than the T&O department in a general hospital. Such a difference 
will reflect factors not allowed for in the payment mechanism.
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where xjk is a vector of patient characteristics measured at 
HRG level namely the proportion of males, average age, 
average socio-economic status, average number of diagno-
ses, and procedures; and zk is a vector of hospital character-
istics such as doctor salaries, a dummy indicating whether 
the hospital is teaching hospital or a foundation trust, size 
dummies calculated using the number of T&O beds to cap-
ture potential economies of scale, the average patient out-
comes for hip and knee replacement as measure of quality, 
and regional dummies to allow for residual geographical 
differences not captured by other adjustments.
The estimated coefficient 𝛽  in model II provides an aver-
age effect across specialist orthopaedic hospitals. There may 
be heterogeneity in terms of their financial position, with 
some exhibiting lower deficits and others higher surpluses. 
To explore such heterogeneity, as a sensitivity analysis, we 
estimate the following model IV, which includes hospital 
fixed effects and directly standardises unit costs (cjk) by the 
MFF index (mk):
In this specification, the specialist orthopaedic hospital 
dummy (sk) used in model I, II, or III is replaced with a 
vector of hospital dummies (hk). Also 휷 is now a vector 
including k coefficients, one for each hospital dummy: for 
instance, if 𝛽k > 0 then the provision of trauma and ortho-
paedic services in hospital k implies lower profit margins 
relative to the average hospital. We directly standardise unit 
costs (cjk) because the MFF index (mk) would be perfectly 
collinear with hospital dummies (hk) if added as an addi-
tional control variable.
All regression models are estimated separately for inlier 
and per diem unit costs because the HRG price is computed 
separately for inlier and excess bed day activity. For each 
model, we obtain the inlier and per diem estimates of 훽, 
which are then used to compute an overall measure of cost 
(for model I) or profitability (for models II, III, and IV). For 
instance, consider our key model II in Eq. (10), which esti-
mates the percentage difference in inlier or per diem profit 
margins between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments. The percentage difference in overall profit mar-
gin per patient treated between specialist orthopaedics hos-
pitals and T&O departments, after allowing for differences 
in unit costs of excess bed days, can be written as:
(11)
ln
(
cjk
)
= 휇 + 훽sk + 훾mk + 훿ejk + 흆
′
xjk + 휽
′
zk + 훼j + 휀jk,
(12)ln
(
cjk
/
mk
)
= 휇 + 휷′hk + 훿ejk + 훼j + 휀jk.
(13)?̄?g − ?̄?s
C̄g
=
(
c̄IN
s
− c̄IN
g
)
ȳ +
(
c̄EB
s
− c̄EB
g
)
q̄
c̄IN
g
ȳ + c̄EB
g
q̄
,
where ?̄?g − ?̄?s is the difference in profit averaged across 
HRGs and hospitals between T&O departments and special-
ist orthopaedic hospitals, expressed as a percentage of the 
T&O departments’ total cost averaged across HRGs and 
hospitals, C̄g (to be consistent with the interpretation of prof-
itability of the inlier activity, 𝛽IN, and excess bed day activ-
ity, 𝛽EB); c̄IN
s
− c̄IN
g
= 𝛽IN c̄IN
g
 and c̄EB
s
− c̄EB
g
= 𝛽EBc̄EB
g
 are the 
difference in inlier and per diem unit costs averaged across 
HRGs and hospitals, respectively; ȳ and q̄ are the average 
volume of patients and the average number of excess bed 
days, respectively.9 Standard errors of the overall estimates 
are bootstrapped using 1000 replications.
Data
Our primary source of data is the RC database for the finan-
cial year 2013/14. For every admission type of every single 
inpatient HRG, each hospital annually reports information 
on inlier unit costs, per diem unit costs, number of patients, 
and excess bed days.
Hospitals follow a standard process in calculating unit 
costs by applying the rules set out in the NHS costing man-
ual, which establishes three basic principles [29]: first, costs 
capture the full cost of the services delivered, so that they 
can be reconciled back to the original aggregated costs in 
the accounts; second, costs are preferably allocated through 
direct imputation rather than through apportionment; and 
third, costs rigorously match the services generating them. 
The costing process consists of a top-down approach that, 
in the first instance, groups total costs into: costs that are 
directly attributable to patients (e.g., doctors, nurses, drugs); 
costs that are only indirectly linked to patients and that are 
identified on an activity basis (e.g., linen, catering); and 
overhead costs that are not related to patients (e.g., senior 
managers, administrative employees). Such costs are then 
attributed to macro-areas of treatment and support services 
(e.g., pharmacy, building maintenance), to hospital spe-
cialties (e.g., general surgery, orthopaedics), to wards, and 
finally to HRGs. Costs are further split by admission type 
such as non-elective (short or long), elective, and day case.10 
9 The computation of the overall profitabil-
ity for model IV in Eq.  (12) differs from the com-
putation described in Eq.  (13). It becomes (
?̄?k − ?̄?
)/
C̄ =
[(
c̄IN
k
− c̄IN
)
ȳ +
(
c̄EB
k
− c̄EB
)
q̄
]/(
c̄INȳ + cEBq̄
)
, where 
?̄?k and c̄k are the hospital k’s total profit and unit cost respectively 
averaged across HRGs and hospitals, ?̄? and c̄ are the total profit and 
unit cost respectively averaged across HRGs and hospitals, C̄ is the 
total cost averaged across HRGs and hospitals, 
(
c̄IN
k
− c̄IN
)
= 𝛽INc̄IN 
and 
(
c̄EB
k
− c̄EB
)
= 𝛽EBc̄EB. Also in this case, the standard errors of 
the overall estimates are bootstrapped using 1000 repetitions.
10 Unlike elective and day case patients, the admission of non-elec-
tive patients is unplanned. Day case and short non-elective patients 
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Cost data are audited and must comply with validation rules 
to assure their accuracy, which is fundamental for the calcu-
lation of the national tariffs [30].
Our sample for the analysis of inlier unit costs consists of 
79,096 observations across 1284 HRGs and 134 hospitals.11 
Of these observations, 14,181 refer to day case treatment, 
18,170 to elective care, 19,532 are short-stay non-elective 
care, and 27,186 are long-stay non-elective care. The sam-
ple for the analysis of per diem unit costs comprises 16,098 
observations, of which 4087 are elective and 12,011 are 
non-elective.
For every HRG in each hospital, we calculate the propor-
tion of patients who receive specialised orthopaedic services, 
the proportion of male patients, average patient age, average 
socio-economic status, average number of diagnoses, and 
procedures using data summarised from patient-level infor-
mation in the HES [31].12 We collect several variables meas-
ured at hospital level, most of which are from the Health 
and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC; since renamed 
NHS Digital): a dummy variable for specialist orthopae-
dic hospitals, teaching hospitals, and foundation trusts; the 
average salary of doctors employed in the T&O specialty;13 
and regional dummies. The HSCIC also provides Patient 
Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) including, for each 
hospital, the average health change of patients undergo-
ing hip and knee replacement [32, 33]. PROMs measure 
the patients’ quality of life through the EQ-5D health-sta-
tus questionnaire before and 6 months after their surgery. 
Hence, the health change is the difference between the post 
and pre-surgery EQ-5D scores, and it is estimated through a 
risk-adjustment methodology that takes account of patient 
characteristics and factors beyond hospitals’ control [34].14 
Using data from the NHS statistics, we construct dummies 
related to the size of the T&O department (small, medium, 
large, and very large), which are defined on the quartiles of 
the T&O beds distribution of all hospitals. Finally, the RC 
database reports the MFF index.
Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 illustrates that the distribution of inlier and per 
diem unit costs substantially departs from normality when 
in natural units, while it is approximately normal after taking 
the log. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables measured at HRG level for the sample with observa-
tions of all admission types.15 Our sample includes the three 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals and 131 T&O departments 
in general hospitals. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have 
on average higher inlier unit costs than T&O departments 
(£5196 vs. £2987) and a higher number of patients per HRG 
(20 vs. 12). The proportion of patients receiving specialised 
services is higher in specialist orthopaedic hospitals (1.1%) 
than T&O departments (0.1%). 49% of patients are male in 
both specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments, 
while patients in specialist orthopaedic hospitals are on aver-
age 8 years younger (47 vs. 55) and better-off (deprivation 
index greater by 2%). Specialist orthopaedic hospitals record 
about the same number of diagnoses (5) for their average 
patient but provide one more procedure (4 vs. 3) than T&O 
departments. 
The lower part of Table 1 also provides descriptive sta-
tistics for excess bed days. Per diem unit costs are on aver-
age higher in specialist orthopaedic hospitals (£465) than in 
T&O departments (£301). There are on average 22 excess 
bed days per HRG, but many more in the specialist ortho-
paedic hospitals (45) than in T&O departments (22). The 
proportion of patients receiving specialised services with 
a per diem unit cost is also higher in specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals (2.7% vs. 0.1%). Similarly, the proportion of male 
patients with a long length of stay in specialist hospitals is 
slightly greater than in T&O departments (47.5% vs. 46.8%). 
Footnote 10 (continued)
do not have an overnight stay in hospital, while elective and long non-
elective patients have at least one overnight stay.
11 10 T&O departments in general hospitals did not report data on 
PROMs for hip or knee replacement and they are, therefore, dropped 
from the sample.
12 We count specialised services following the rules defined in the 
Prescribed Specialised Services, and not the criteria specified in 
the Specialised Services National Definition Sets. We use the over-
all Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) as a measure of socio-eco-
nomic status. This index is constructed through the combination of 
seven IMD domains such as income, employment, health deprivation 
and disability, education, skills and training, barriers to housing and 
services, crime, and living environment. A value of one indicates 
extreme deprivation while 32,482 indicates no deprivation.
13 The salary of a doctor employed in the T&O specialty is estimated 
through a s-shape function of age, minimum and maximum salary. 
Further details are provided in the "Appendix 1".
14 More precisely, the risk-adjustment methodology comprises three 
steps. The first step consists of estimating a generalised least-square 
fixed-effects model in which the dependent variable is the post-
surgery EQ-5D score of each patient, the covariates are pre-surgery 
EQ-5D score, patient characteristics (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity), 
economic deprivation, comorbidity, procedure and post-operative 
length of stay. This regression also controls for unobserved hospital 
heterogeneity through fixed effects. In the second step, the model is 
used to estimate predictions. The third step aggregates such predic-
tions to obtain the adjusted average post-surgery EQ-5D score for 
each provider, from which the national average pre-surgery EQ-5D 
score is subtracted for the calculation of the adjusted average health 
gain.
Footnote 14 (continued)
15 Tables 6 and 7 in the "Appendix 2" show descriptive statistics of 
the variables measured at HRG level for the sample with day case and 
elective observations, and short non-elective and long-non elective 
observations, respectively.
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Long-stay patients are 9 years younger (49 vs. 58), better-off 
(deprivation index greater by 3%), and have the same num-
ber of diagnoses (5) but one more procedure (4 vs. 3) in spe-
cialist orthopaedic hospitals compared to T&O departments.
Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics of the variables 
measured at hospital level. 24 (17.9%) trusts are teaching 
hospitals, and 80 (59.7%) hospitals have foundation status. 
Two of the specialist orthopaedic hospitals are foundation 
trusts but none is a teaching hospital. 15 hospitals are in the 
London region, one of which is specialised. The remaining 
two specialist orthopaedic hospitals are located in the West 
Midlands region, which includes 14 other general hospitals. 
The regions with the largest and smallest number of hospi-
tals are, respectively, the North West including 22 hospitals, 
and the East Midlands and the North East with 8 hospitals. 
On the basis of the quartile division, a T&O department is 
categorised as small if it has less than 46 specialty beds, 
medium if between 46 and 61 beds, large if between 62 and 
79 beds, and very large if it has more than 79 beds. The 
three specialist orthopaedic hospitals fall into the very large 
group. The MFF index is on average greater in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals compared to T&O departments (1.085 
vs. 1.075). A doctor working in T&O earns on average 
approximately £86,000. Doctors in specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals are paid 5.6% more, on average, than doctors in 
T&O departments.
Of all NHS patients treated in the T&O specialty, 9.5% 
received a hip replacement and 6.7% underwent a knee 
replacement. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have a higher 
average health gain for hip (0.442 vs. 0.425) and knee (0.317 
vs. 0.315) replacement.
Results
Table 3 provides the estimation results of models I, II, and 
III for inlier and per diem unit costs when all admission 
types are included in the sample. Recall that unit costs are 
in logs. The specialist orthopaedic hospital dummy’s esti-
mated coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 
5% level in models I and II but it is insignificant in model III 
for the inlier unit costs. It is always negative but statistically 
Fig. 1  Distribution of inlier and per diem unit costs in natural units and logs
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insignificant in the regressions for the per diem unit costs. 
Specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in 
general hospitals have therefore statistically different costs 
for the inlier activity but statistically similar costs for the 
excess bed day activity. The first column of Table 3 shows 
the estimates of model I in Eq. (9), indicating raw differ-
ences in unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals 
and T&O departments. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have 
on average [exp(0.149) − 1 =]16 16.1% higher inlier unit 
costs. In contrast, they have on average 14.4% lower per 
diem unit costs, but this result is not statistically significant.
Model II in Eq. (10) provides estimates of differences 
in unit costs after accounting for differences in revenue by 
subtracting tariffs (HRG fixed effects) and by accounting 
for tariff adjustments (MFF and specialised services top-
ups). The specialist orthopaedic hospital dummy’s estimated 
coefficient therefore can be interpreted as the difference in 
profit margins between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and 
T&O departments.17 Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have 
on average 20.3% lower inlier profit margins. A percentage 
point increase in the proportion of specialised services raises 
inlier unit costs by 1.2%. A standard deviation increase in 
the MFF (0.064) is associated with an increase in inlier unit 
costs of 5.6%.
With model III in Eq. (11), we investigate whether differ-
ences in profit margins can be explained by patient and hos-
pital characteristics. The differences in inlier and per diem 
unit costs (𝛽) are both statistically insignificant, as are the 
variables capturing hospital characteristics. Instead, patient 
characteristics measuring age and number of diagnoses 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics of variables measured at HRG level
Variable at HRG level All hospitals Specialist hospitals General hospitals
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Inlier
 Inlier unit cost 3031 3484 22 129,419 5196 8555 173 129,419 2987 3287 22 78,447
 Number of patients (FCEs) 12.2 37.4 1 1622 20.3 57.7 1 644 12.1 36.9 1 1622
 Number of specialised services 0.05 0.73 0 55 0.66 4.23 0 55 0.04 0.42 0 26
 Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.7 0.0 100.0 1.1 6.1 0.0 69.2 0.1 1.5 0.0 100.0
 Proportion of males (%) 49.1 19.6 0.0 100.0 49.2 24.3 0.0 100.0 49.1 19.5 0.0 100.0
 Age 54.7 18.9 0.0 97.0 47.4 17.4 1.0 90.0 54.8 18.9 0.0 97.0
 Deprivation index 15,969 4889 12 32,474 16,296 4365 194 32,417 15,963 4899 12 32,474
 Number of diagnoses 4.969 2.655 1 20 4.733 2.511 1 13 4.974 2.657 1 20
 Number of procedures 3.079 2.108 0 24 4.118 2.158 0 12 3.058 2.102 0 24
 Number of HRGs 1284 415 1272
 Observations 79,069 1564 77,505
Excess bed day
 Per diem unit cost 305 474 20 54,422 465 2867 65 54,422 301 188 20 9499
 Number of excess bed days 22.2 35.5 1 715 44.8 81.8 1 715 21.7 33.4 1 538
 Number of specialised services 0.11 1.31 0 55 1.95 7.56 0 55 0.07 0.56 0 26
 Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 2.0 0.0 69.2 2.7 9.6 0.0 69.2 0.1 1.3 0.0 45.6
 Proportion of males (%) 46.8 16.2 0.0 100.0 47.5 18.1 0.0 100.0 46.8 16.2 0.0 100.0
 Age 57.8 15.7 0.1 97.0 49.2 16.2 7.9 90.0 58.0 15.6 0.1 97.0
 Deprivation index 16,047 4564 201 32,268 16,499 3636 1428 31,664 16,036 4583 201 32,268
 Number of diagnoses 5.096 2.535 1 20 4.906 2.501 2 13 5.100 2.536 1 20
 Number of procedures 3.160 2.096 0 24 4.378 2.265 0 12 3.131 2.084 0 24
 Number of HRGs 675 183 662
 Observations 16,098 373 15,725
16 The exponential transformation is applied to all the figures 
reported in the text in this section. This explains the differences with 
the coefficients reported in Table 3.
17 Recall that the unit cost is the dependent variable in model II (III 
or IV) while tariffs are on the right-hand side of the equation. Under 
such a regression design, β reflects the difference between unit costs 
and tariffs instead of the definition of profit margins, i.e., difference 
between tariffs and unit costs. To abide by the correct definition of 
profit margins, the interpretation of β must be reversed so that, for 
example, a positive estimate indicates lower profit margins in special-
ist orthopaedic hospitals relative to T&O departments in general hos-
pitals.
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and procedures are significant at 1% level in explaining 
the differences in inlier (but not per diem) profit margins 
between specialist orthopaedic hospital and T&O depart-
ments.18 Age and inlier unit costs have a quadratic relation-
ship so that unit costs decrease up to 75 years (− 0.015/
(2 × 0.0001)) and increase above that. At the sample mean of 
54.7 years, one more year decreases inlier unit costs by 0.4% 
(− 0.015 + 2 × 0.0001 × 54.7). An additional diagnosis or 
procedure raises inlier unit costs by 3.8% or 2.4%, respec-
tively. We extend model III by adding interactions between 
all control variables. We find that differences in both inlier 
and per diem profit margins between specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals and T&O departments remain statistically insig-
nificant (see Table 10 in the "Appendix 3").19
So far, we have presented our findings on specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals for inlier and excess bed day hos-
pital activity, separately. Table 4 reports the overall per-
centage change in unit costs (𝛽 ) between specialist ortho-
paedic hospitals and T&O departments for each admission 
type.20 The overall percentage change is calculated as the 
sum of inlier and per diem percentage changes in unit costs 
or profit margins. The first column shows the percentage 
changes derived from model I. The overall unit costs are not 
statistically different between specialist orthopaedic hos-
pitals and T&O departments. In model II, when hospital 
revenues are taken into account, specialist orthopaedic hos-
pitals have on average 13% lower overall profit margins than 
T&O departments at 1% of statistical significance (see foot-
note 17 for details on the interpretation). Model III shows 
that the overall profit margins in specialist orthopaedic 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of variables measured at hospital trust level
Variable at hospital trust level All hospitals Specialist hospitals General hospitals
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.022 0.148 0 1 1.000 0.000 1 1 0.000 0.000 0 0
Market forces factor 1.076 0.064 1.003 1.298 1.085 0.082 1.032 1.180 1.075 0.063 1.003 1.298
Salary of doctors (£10,000) 8.664 0.744 6.596 10.060 9.134 0.293 8.797 9.324 8.653 0.749 6.596 10.060
Teaching hospital 0.179 0.385 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.183 0.388 0 1
Foundation hospital 0.597 0.492 0 1 0.667 0.577 0 1 0.595 0.493 0 1
Small department 0.201 0.403 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.206 0.406 0 1
Medium department 0.284 0.452 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.290 0.456 0 1
Large department 0.254 0.437 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.260 0.440 0 1
Very large department 0.261 0.441 0 1 1.000 0.000 1 1 0.244 0.431 0 1
Average health change after hip replacement 0.425 0.028 0.311 0.476 0.442 0.033 0.410 0.476 0.425 0.028 0.311 0.474
Average health change after knee replacement 0.315 0.028 0.215 0.396 0.317 0.025 0.288 0.332 0.315 0.028 0.215 0.396
London 0.112 0.316 0 1 0.333 0.577 0 1 0.107 0.310 0 1
East Midlands 0.060 0.238 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.061 0.240 0 1
East of England 0.127 0.334 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.130 0.337 0 1
North East 0.060 0.238 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.061 0.240 0 1
North West 0.164 0.372 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.168 0.375 0 1
South East 0.149 0.358 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.153 0.361 0 1
South West 0.112 0.316 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.115 0.320 0 1
West Midlands 0.119 0.325 0 1 0.667 0.577 0 1 0.107 0.310 0 1
Yorkshire and The Humber 0.097 0.297 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.099 0.300 0 1
Number of trusts 134 3 131
18 To reinforce this finding, we provide the results of a stepwise 
regression in Table  8 in  the "Appendix  3". These results show that 
age, number of diagnoses, and procedures together drive the differ-
ences in inlier unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and 
T&O departments in general hospitals, with there being a seeming 
difference between the hospital types if any of these patient charac-
teristics are omitted. Table  9 shows that differences between hospi-
tal types in per diem unit costs are always statistically insignificant 
whether or not patient characteristics are accounted for.
19 As a further robustness check, we estimate model V, which is 
akin to model III but also includes hospital random effects. Unlike 
the hospital fixed-effects model, the hospital random-effects model 
can be estimated when the specialist orthopaedic hospital dummy 
is included, although this requires the additional assumption that 
the covariates are uncorrelated with the HRG-invariant unobserved 
hospital heterogeneity. Table 11 in the "Appendix 3" shows that the 
results for model V are very similar to those for model III.
Footnote 19 (continued)
20 Recall that the percentage change (𝛽) is obtained through the 
exponential transformation of the estimated coefficient (𝛽).
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hospitals are no longer significantly different from those in 
T&O departments after controlling for some key determi-
nants including patient characteristics such as proportion 
of males, age, socio-economic status, number of diagnoses 
and procedures, and hospital characteristics such as salary 
of doctors, hospital type, specialty size, quality, and other 
regional differences.  
Table 3  Estimation results when all admission types are included
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses
***p value < 0.01, **p value < 0.05, *p value < 0.1
Regressor Inlier Per diem
Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.149** 0.185** 0.149 − 0.156 − 0.276 − 0.140
(0.059) (0.076) (0.097) (0.187) (0.196) (0.204)
Market forces factor 0.845*** 0.928** 0.353 0.485
(0.213) (0.460) (0.381) (1.228)
Proportion of specialised services 0.012** 0.010* 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Proportion of males − 0.00009 − 0.0004
(0.000) (0.001)
Age − 0.015*** − 0.006
(0.004) (0.006)
Age (squared) 0.0001*** 0.0001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Deprivation index − 0.000003 − 0.000007
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of diagnoses 0.037*** − 0.031*
(0.010) (0.018)
Number of procedures 0.024*** − 0.017
(0.007) (0.012)
Salary of doctors 0.003 − 0.041
(0.021) (0.040)
Teaching trust 0.057* 0.097
(0.034) (0.076)
Foundation trust − 0.049* 0.011
(0.026) (0.059)
Medium department − 0.019 − 0.068
(0.035) (0.081)
Large department − 0.021 0.002
(0.032) (0.083)
Very large department 0.022 − 0.117
(0.034) (0.077)
Average health change after hip replacement 0.952* − 1.896*
(0.523) (1.081)
Average health change after knee replacement − 0.414 0.468
(0.465) (1.177)
Constant 6.625*** 6.429***
(0.608) (1.607)
HRG fixed effects NO YES YES NO YES YES
Regional fixed effects NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 79,069 79,069 79,069 16,098 16,098 16,098
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.797 0.805 0.005 0.074 0.157
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Sensitivity analysis
As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate the same three models 
for each admission type. The lower panel of Table 4 (sec-
ond column) shows that statistically significant lower overall 
profit margins in specialist orthopaedic hospitals are found 
for elective (22.6%) and long non-elective activity (38.9%), 
but not for short non-elective and day case activity.
Finally, estimation of model IV including hospital fixed 
effects in Eq. (12) suggests wide variation in overall (inlier) 
profit margins across hospitals in our sample, from 37.5% 
(38.6%) below the average to 38% (40.6%) above the aver-
age. Figure 2 indicates that 45 hospitals, i.e., about a third, 
have significantly lower overall profit margins compared to 
the average profit margins, and 42 have significantly higher 
overall profit margins.21 None of the three specialist ortho-
paedic hospitals have overall or inlier profit margins signifi-
cantly above the average. In particular, as shown in Table 5, 
the overall profit margins of the Robert Jones and Agnes 
Hunt orthopaedic hospital (− 19.9%) and the Royal ortho-
paedic hospital (− 35.2%) are significantly below the aver-
age.22 The Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital has instead 
average overall profit margins. The latter finding is driven by 
higher profit margins on day case activity (40.6%).
Table 4  Differences in unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hos-
pitals and T&O departments in general hospitals
a Standard errors are bootstrapped using 1000 replications
p value in parentheses; ***p value  <  0.01, **p value  <  0.05, 
*p value < 0.1
Inpatient activity Model I Model II Model III
All admission types
 Overalla 0.114 0.135*** 0.116
(0.157) (0.000) (0.466)
 Inlier 0.161** 0.203** 0.161
(0.013) (0.016) (0.125)
 Per diem − 0.144 − 0.241 − 0.131
(0.408) (0.161) (0.494)
Elective
 Overalla 0.254*** 0.226*** 0.204**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026)
 Inlier 0.311*** 0.282*** 0.249***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 Per diem − 0.225 − 0.248 − 0.176
(0.195) (0.175) (0.243)
Long non-elective
 Overalla 0.601*** 0.389*** 0.403*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.076)
 Inlier 0.741* 0.499*** 0.486***
(0.064) (0.004) (0.003)
 Per diem − 0.140 − 0.192 − 0.033
(0.395) (0.196) (0.864)
Short non-elective 0.293 0.320 0.369*
(0.101) (0.147) (0.099)
Day case − 0.071 0.029 − 0.018
(0.731) (0.887) (0.924)
Fig. 2  Distribution of overall and inlier profit margins
21 We count only hospitals for which confidence intervals do not 
overlap the dashed horizontal line at zero, i.e., hospitals for which 
the deviation of profit margins from the mean is statistically different 
from zero.
22 Recall that βk in model IV captures the deviation of hospital k’s 
profit margins from the mean profit margins: a positive βk means that 
hospital k’s profit margins are lower than the mean, while a negative βk 
suggests that hospital k’s profit margins are higher than the mean (see 
also footnote 17 for details on the interpretation). For ease of inter-
pretation, we multiply the estimate of βk by minus one and, therefore, 
the negative sign now indicates profit margins that are lower than the 
mean. All coefficients in Table 5 indicate the percentage change (𝛽k) 
obtained through the exponential transformation of 𝛽k.
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Discussion and conclusions
The English NTPS is used to reimburse hospitals according 
to the amount and mix of activity that they undertake. Like 
most PPSs, there is a recognition that HRGs imperfectly 
account for all patient or exogenous hospital characteris-
tics that might influence costs [35, 36]. As such, payment 
adjustments include top-ups to the tariff if patients received 
particular specialised care and payment corrections allow 
for differential costs of labour and capital across the coun-
try. These refinements help ensure a fair reimbursement sys-
tem that rewards hospitals according to the care that they 
provide, not the advantageous circumstances in which they 
might operate [5, 37].
Given these payment adjustments, hospitals that provide 
care at a cost below tariff should be more profitable. Argu-
ably specialist hospitals should be in a strong position to 
benefit financially from these arrangements. By focussing on 
a limited set of services they should be able to better exploit 
informational or organisational advantages associated with 
specialisation. Such advantages derive from concentrating 
on a specific, defined caseload that enhances learning-by-
doing and attracts staff with particular expertise and more 
easily allows efficient practice in care delivery to be identi-
fied and operationalised [13].
If these advantages obtain we would expect specialist 
hospitals to earn higher profits than general hospitals that 
undertake similar activities. The evidence provided in this 
study does not support this claim. We have analysed the 
costs and revenues associated with delivery of trauma and 
orthopaedic services in all three specialist orthopaedic hos-
pitals and 131 T&O departments in general hospitals in Eng-
land. We find that, compared to the national average, profit 
margins are 13% lower in the three specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals. Profits are statistically significantly lower across 
all patients that have at least one overnight stay, either elec-
tive or non-elective.
These lower profits are not due simply to patients in 
specialist hospitals requiring long lengths of stay or spe-
cialist care. Payment arrangements allow for this possibil-
ity through excess bed day payments and tariff top-ups for 
specialised treatments, and we account for these revenue 
adjustments in our analysis. Nor does it appear that differ-
ences can be explained by the characteristics of the hospitals 
such as their teaching and foundation status or geographical 
location, nor by the number of the T&O patients treated, nor 
by variation in doctors’ salaries, nor by the quality of care 
as captured by PROMs for two high-volume orthopaedic 
procedures such as hip and knee replacement. Lower profits 
are observed even after these potential explanatory factors 
are taken into account.
Instead, we find that lower profit margins in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals are explained by patient characteris-
tics such as age and severity as captured by the number of 
diagnoses and procedures. This means that although hospi-
tal payments are based on a detailed patient classification 
system (HRG) and on adjustments for the higher cost of 
specialised care, providers that generally attract more com-
plex patients such as specialist orthopaedic hospitals may be 
financially disadvantaged. That said, being part of a general 
hospital does not guarantee better financial performance 
with 33% of the T&O departments also making a loss.
Our study has three main limitations. First, our sample 
includes only three specialist orthopaedic hospitals. Such a 
small number of specialist orthopaedic hospital trusts, how-
ever, is not the result of sample selection but reflects the real-
ity that there are only three specialist orthopaedic hospital 
trusts in the English NHS. Specialist hospitals are few and 
far between in many countries. Hence, we believe that our 
analysis is appropriate and generally applicable. Moreover, 
although we are limited by the actual number of hospitals, 
we analyse hundreds of HRGs for each specialist hospital 
and we investigate heterogeneity across the three hospitals in 
model IV using hospital fixed effects. This model shows that 
two of the three specialist hospitals make a loss and none of 
them makes a profit, which confirms that specialist ortho-
paedic hospitals are in a relatively weak financial position.
Second, our estimated tariffs may not be identical to cur-
rent tariffs, i.e., the actual tariffs that hospitals receive in 
2013/14. We compute tariffs by including in our models (II, 
III, or IV) the HRG fixed effects, which capture the unit cost 
of each HRG averaged across hospitals. This reflects the 
methodology used to compute current tariffs but, in practice, 
current tariffs are based on cost data lagged by 3 years in 
Table 5  Specialist orthopaedic hospitals’ overall profit margins
* Significantly different from the average hospital at 5%
Specialist orthopaedic hospital All admission 
types (%)
Day case (%) Elective (%) Short non-elective Long non-
elective 
(%)
Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital NHS Trust 0.0 40.6* − 30.5* − 79.4* − 80.5*
Robert Jones and Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust
− 19.9* − 21.5* − 18.0* 4.2  − 4.8
Royal Orthopaedic Hospital NHS Foundation Trust − 35.2* − 29.5* − 29.0* − 69.0 * − 30.6*
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order to ensure data accuracy and stakeholder engagement 
in their calculation [21]. To account for the time lag, the cur-
rent tariffs’ methodology adjusts for inflation and efficiency 
trends. We therefore argue that tariffs estimated through our 
methods are a reasonable approximation to current tariffs.
Finally, PROMs are currently available only for two 
orthopaedic procedures such as hip and knee replacements. 
These procedures are, however, the most common in T&O 
departments: of all NHS patients treated in the T&O spe-
cialty, 9.5% receive a hip replacement and 6.7% undergo 
a knee replacement. We therefore argue that hip and knee 
replacements are indicative of departmental performance.
Future research may be required before a definitive recom-
mendation about whether profit margins differ in trauma and 
orthopaedic services across general and specialised hospitals. 
But we have set out a methodology that can be applied to other 
types of hospital service and in other settings, to investigate the 
extent to which differences in costs between groups of hospi-
tals are adequately covered by prospective payment systems.
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Appendix 1: estimation of the salary of doctors
We assume that the salary of doctors follows a s-shape function 
depending on age, minimum and maximum salary. This means 
that salary rises with increasing returns in the first half of the 
working life, and it goes up with decreasing returns during the 
second half. In symbols, we estimate the salary as follows:
where wnk is the salary of doctor n (= 1,… ,N) in hospital k, 
fnk is the full-time equivalent ratio,23 W is the s-shape salary 
(14)wnk = fnk ⋅ W
(
wmin,wmax,Aage
)
function, wmin and wmax are the minimum and maximum 
salaries associated to the doctor’s grade, and Aage is a coef-
ficient varying depending on the doctor’s age. The salary 
function W  can be represented as follows:
where,
In Fig. 3, we illustrate the salary function W(⋅) for con-
sultant and associate specialist doctors.
The average salary of doctors in hospital k (wk) is there-
fore calculated as follows:
Appendix 2: descriptive statistics by admission 
type
See Tables 6 and 7.
(15)
W
�
wmin,wmax,Aage
�
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
wmin if age < 30
wmin +
wmax−wmin
Aage
if 30 ≤ age < 50
wmax −
wmax−wmin
Aage
if 30 ≤ age < 50
wmax if age ≥ 50
(16)Aage =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
20 if 30 ≤ age ≤ 34 or 65 ≤ age ≤ 69
10 if 35 ≤ age ≤ 39 or 60 ≤ age ≤ 64
5.5 if 40 ≤ age ≤ 44 or 55 ≤ age ≤ 59
3.2 if 45 ≤ age ≤ 54 or 55 ≤ age ≤ 59
(17)wk =
∑
n wnk
Nk
.
Fig. 3  Estimated salary function for consultants and associate spe-
cialists
23 The full-time equivalent ratio is the proportion of the total number 
of paid hours during a period over the number of working hours in 
that period.
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Table 6  Descriptive statistics 
for day case and elective 
activity
Variable at HRG level All hospitals Specialist hospitals General hospitals
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Day case
 Inlier unit cost 1408 876 1492 973 1406 872
 Number of patients (FCEs) 26 67 33 77 25 66
 Number of specialised services 0.07 0.75 0.43 3.10 0.06 0.52
 Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 1.8 0.6 4.2 0.2 1.6
 Proportion of males (%) 49.8 19.5 48.6 22.5 49.8 19.4
 Age 49.6 17.2 44.2 17.3 49.8 17.1
 Deprivation index 16,039 4769 16,140 3868 16,036 4795
 Number of diagnoses 3.718 1.704 3.983 1.926 3.709 1.695
 Number of procedures 3.449 1.630 4.041 1.729 3.430 1.623
 Number of HRGs 509 239 490
 Observations 14,181 441 13,740
Elective
 Inlier
  Inlier unit cost 3680 3620 5978 8808 3586 3200
  Number of patients (FCEs) 16 42 23 58 15 41
  Number of specialised services 0.07 0.94 0.61 4.06 0.05 0.47
  Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 2.3 1.2 6.3 0.2 1.9
  Proportion of males (%) 48.9 19.5 49.4 26.3 48.9 19.2
  Age 54.6 16.9 47.6 17.9 54.8 16.8
  Deprivation index 16,080 4807 16,368 4648 16,068 4813
  Number of diagnoses 4.644 2.369 4.908 2.640 4.633 2.357
  Number of procedures 3.516 1.901 4.195 2.288 3.488 1.879
  Number of HRGs 730 350 696
  Observations 18,179 716 17,463
Excess bed day
  Per diem unit cost 358 897 563 3450 344 245
  Number of excess bed days 19 34 49 92 17 25
  Number of specialised services 0.24 1.91 1.65 6.66 0.14 0.88
  Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.4 2.9 2.5 9.0 0.3 1.8
  Proportion of males (%) 46.7 14.4 46.6 18.1 46.7 14.1
  Age 56.2 13.3 48.9 16.3 56.7 12.9
  Deprivation index 16,235 4350 16,557 3762 16,213 4386
  Number of diagnoses 4.343 2.076 4.807 2.494 4.312 2.041
  Number of procedures 3.656 1.838 4.416 2.263 3.605 1.795
  Number of HRGs 313 151 282
  Observations 4087 257 3830
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Table 7  Descriptive statistics 
for short non-elective and long 
non-elective activity
Variable at HRG level All hospitals Specialist hospitals General hos-
pitals
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Short non-elective
 Inlier unit cost 1253 1381 2154 3412 1248 1358
 Number of patients (FCEs) 6 12 2 1 6 12
 Number of specialised services 0.03 0.39 0.20 1.93 0.03 0.36
 Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 0.9 0.4 3.8 0.1 0.8
 Proportion of males (%) 49.5 18.6 50.0 21.9 49.5 18.6
 Age 52.7 20.8 47.8 16.8 52.7 20.8
 Deprivation index 15,908 4843 15,869 4634 15,908 4845
 Number of diagnoses 4.840 2.562 4.490 2.196 4.842 2.564
 Number of procedures 2.466 1.907 3.656 2.115 2.459 1.903
 Number of HRGs 839 97 836
 Observations 19,523 119 19,404
Long non-elective
 Inlier
  Inlier unit cost 4720 4241 10,181 12,150 4661 4035
  Number of patients (FCEs) 8 17 3 3 8 18
  Number of specialised services 0.04 0.76 1.31 6.28 0.03 0.37
  Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.7 1.9 8.4 0.1 1.4
  Proportion of males (%) 48.6 20.5 49.4 22.6 48.5 20.4
  Age 58.9 18.7 51.4 15.7 59.0 18.7
  Deprivation index 15,902 5035 16,529 4240 15,895 5043
  Number of diagnoses 5.933 2.947 5.547 2.770 5.937 2.949
  Number of procedures 3.035 2.458 4.235 2.403 3.022 2.456
  Number of HRGs 1022 175 1020
  Observations 27,186 288 26,898
Excess bed day
  Per diem unit cost 286 162 247 148 287 162
  Number of excess bed days 23 36 35 53 23 36
  Number of specialised services 0.07 1.02 2.61 9.25 0.04 0.40
  Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.6 3.2 10.8 0.1 1.1
  Proportion of males (%) 46.9 16.8 49.6 18.1 46.8 16.8
  Age 58.4 16.4 49.8 15.9 58.5 16.4
  Deprivation index 15,983 4633 16,370 3353 15,979 4643
  Number of diagnoses 5.352 2.625 5.126 2.512 5.354 2.626
  Number of procedures 2.992 2.151 4.296 2.276 2.979 2.146
  Number of HRGs 647 86 643
  Observations 12,011 116 11,895
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Appendix 3: additional sensitivity analysis
See Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11.
Table 8  Stepwise regression analysis in model III for inlier unit costs
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses
***p value < 0.01, **p value < 0.05, *p value < 0.1
Regressor Inlier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.147 0.199** 0.200** 0.178** 0.181** 0.159* 0.165* 0.170*
(0.099) (0.085) (0.085) (0.089) (0.083) (0.095) (0.086) (0.091)
Market forces factor 0.810* 0.947** 0.945** 0.875** 1.043** 0.927** 1.027** 1.036**
(0.450) (0.441) (0.441) (0.435) (0.469) (0.459) (0.468) (0.463)
Proportion of specialised services 0.010* 0.011** 0.011** 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Proportion of males 0.00005 0.0004 − 0.0001 − 0.0001 − 0.00004 − 0.0002 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age − 0.015*** − 0.013*** − 0.013*** − 0.014*** − 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age (squared) 0.00008** 0.00007* 0.00008* 0.00009** 0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deprivation index − 0.000003 − 0.000004 − 0.000003 − 0.000004 − 0.000004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of diagnoses 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.033***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of procedures 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Salary of doctors − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.0006 0.003 − 0.0007 0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Teaching trust 0.081** 0.081** 0.070** 0.066* 0.058* 0.063* 0.066*
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Foundation trust − 0.063** − 0.063** − 0.060** − 0.058** − 0.050* − 0.055** − 0.052**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Medium department − 0.007 − 0.007 − 0.013 − 0.021 − 0.017 − 0.022 − 0.015
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Large department − 0.013 − 0.013 − 0.018 − 0.021 − 0.021 − 0.021 − 0.018
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Very large department 0.026 0.026 0.022 0.02 0.023 0.019 0.024
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Average health change after hip 
replacement
0.825 0.825 0.847 0.89 0.952* 0.900* 0.936*
(0.554) (0.553) (0.546) (0.546) (0.524) (0.540) (0.531)
Average health change after knee 
replacement
− 0.519 − 0.515 − 0.485 − 0.373 − 0.453 − 0.332 − 0.402
(0.474) (0.474) (0.477) (0.476) (0.467) (0.473) (0.466)
Constant 7.100*** 6.372*** 6.356*** 6.913*** 6.697*** 6.681*** 6.618*** 5.979***
(0.553) (0.589) (0.592) (0.589) (0.607) (0.603) (0.611) (0.612)
HRG fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 9  Stepwise regression analysis in model III for per diem unit costs
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses
***p value < 0.01, **p value < 0.05, *p value < 0.1
Regressor Per diem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Specialist orthopaedic hospital − 0.131 − 0.107 − 0.131 − 0.123 − 0.102 − 0.101 − 0.096 − 0.112
(0.304) (0.295) (0.304) (0.306) (0.278) (0.282) (0.278) (0.278)
Market forces factor 0.490 0.910 0.497 0.529 1.239 1.246 1.234 1.133
(1.274) (1.144) (1.271) (1.244) (1.357) (1.334) (1.356) (1.371)
Proportion of specialised services 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Proportion of males − 0.0007 − 0.0009 − 0.0006 − 0.0005 − 0.0005 − 0.0005 − 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age − 0.011 − 0.010 − 0.011 − 0.011 − 0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Age (squared) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deprivation index − 0.000010 − 0.00002* − 0.00002* − 0.00002* − 0.00002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of diagnoses 0.006 − 0.002 0.002
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Number of procedures − 0.022 − 0.012 − 0.018
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Salary of doctors − 0.068 − 0.068 − 0.068 − 0.065 − 0.065 − 0.065 − 0.065
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Teaching trust 0.014 0.015 0.020 0.006 0.006 0.007 − 0.001
(0.087) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090)
Foundation trust 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.050
(0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069)
Medium department − 0.065 − 0.064 − 0.061 − 0.095 − 0.095 − 0.095 − 0.098
(0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
Large department 0.069 0.07 0.073 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.052
(0.094) (0.094) (0.097) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098)
Very large department − 0.036 − 0.036 − 0.032 − 0.043 − 0.043 − 0.043 − 0.048
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.092)
Average health change after hip replacement − 0.225 − 0.222 − 0.228 − 0.031 − 0.036 − 0.028 − 0.020
(1.275) (1.274) (1.276) (1.282) (1.283) (1.280) (1.283)
Average health change after knee replace-
ment
0.936 0.924 0.895 1.392 1.397 1.375 1.382
(1.211) (1.215) (1.222) (1.255) (1.267) (1.255) (1.275)
Constant 5.539*** 4.979*** 5.568*** 5.732*** 4.810*** 4.810*** 4.863*** 4.854**
(1.744) (1.350) (1.752) (1.647) (1.753) (1.754) (1.759) (1.922)
HRG fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 10  Analysis of 
interactions between covariates 
in model III
Interactions not significant at 1% or 5% level are not reported
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level
***p value < 0.01, **p value < 0.05, *p value < 0.1
Regressor Inlier Per diem
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.083 − 0.146
 (1) Market forces factor − 6.022 − 1.440
 (2) Proportion of specialised services − 0.198* − 0.054
 (3) Proportion of males − 0.005 − 0.012
 (4) Age 0.044 − 0.004
 (5) Age (squared) − 0.001*** 0.000
 (6) Deprivation index 0.000 0.000
 (7) Number of diagnoses 0.116 0.064
 (8) Number of procedures − 0.123 0.022
 (9) Salary of doctors − 0.614 − 1.054
 (10) Teaching trust − 1.071 − 1.821
 (11) Foundation trust − 0.712 − 2.798***
 (12) Medium department 0.100 4.843***
 (13) Large department 1.150 2.900
 (14) Very large department 1.099 4.579**
 (15) Average health change after hip repl. 0.656 13.009
 (16) Average health change after knee repl. − 0.082 − 27.838
Interactions
 (1) × (2) 0.150** (4) × (10) 0.010**
 (3) × (2) 0.0002** (6) × (2) 0.000002***
 (3) × (9) − 0.001** (6) × (13) − 0.00002**
 (5) × (11) 0.0001** (6) × (14) − 0.00005***
 (5) × (4) 0.00001*** (6) × (15) 0.001***
 (7) × (2) − 0.003** (7) × (2) 0.002**
 (7) × (3) − 0.0004** (7) × (5) − 0.00004**
 (8) × (11) 0.026** (8) × (11) 0.029***
 (8) × (4) − 0.003*** (11) × (9) − 0.167**
 (8) × (5) 0.00003*** (12) × (1) − 3.635***
 (13) × (11) − 0.184*** (13) × (11) 0.398***
 (14) × (2) 0.028*** (14) × (1) − 3.815***
 (15) × (2) − 0.18** (15) × (12) − 5.829**
 (15) × (11) 2.199** (16) × (9) 3.314***
 (15) × (12) − 2.634** (16) × (11) 8.573***
 (15) × (14) 3.088** (16) × (12) 5.422**
 (16) × (14) − 3.108**
Constant 13.516** 12.454
HRG fixed effects YES YES
Regional fixed effects YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.814 0.307
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